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Abstract. We ponder the question whether quantum physics has had any influence
on philosophy, and if not, whether it ought to have had any. Answers to these
questions are provided, and they turn out to depend on which branch of the tree of
philosophy we sweep, sway and swing, and even which twig of the branch we touch
when we sweep, sway and swing.
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1. Preamble
Quantum mechanics matured in the 1920s, barging into adulthood with the books of Weyl
(1931), Dirac (1931) and Von Neumann (1932); see Jammer, (1966). That quantum me-
chanics was more than just another physical theory, became clear comparatively quickly.
Bohr’s ruminations about ‘the epistemological lessons that quantum theory has taught us’
have become legendary. Most of the founding fathers of quantum mechanics were sensitive
to philosophical consequences of quantum mechanics. They thought about it, talked about
it, and wrote about it in letters and papers (see Jammer, 1974). A little earlier, Einstein’s
theories of relativity had also proved to have philosophical consequences. The Relativity
Revolution and the Quantum Revolution changed physics fundamentally: modern physics
was born. Classical physics had to step aside.
Did these philosophical consequences actually reach philosophy? Has the Quantum Rev-
olution had any influence on philosophy? If it had not had any influence, should it have had
any influence? These questions are the topic of this paper.
A terminological remark. The term quantum physics designates that part of physics
where quantum theories and models are used. This includes quantum mechanics, quantum
field theories, the standard model of elementary particles and their interactions, quantum
solid state physics, quantum cosmology, quantum optics, quantum chemistry, quantum in-
formation theory, quantum gravity, and the new kid on the block: quantum biology.
Since I started in Academia as philosopher of physics about 30 years ago, philosophy of
physics is the first thing that comes to my mind when considering the influence of quantum
physics on philosophy.
2. Influence of Philosophy of Physics
Philosophy of physics is a young branch of the tree of philosophy. The grandfathers were
philosophers of science fully engaging with modern physics:
Hans Reichenbach, Adolf Gru¨nbaum, Hilary Putnam, Howard Stein, Mario Bunge, Paul
Feyerabend, Abner Shimony, . . .
We are talking about the 1950s–1970s. Availing myself to loose generation talk, the next
generation of philosophers of physics were philosophers, some of them physicists who became
philosophers (1970s onwards):
Clifford Hooker (Australia), Diederik Aerts (Belgium), Torretti (Chile), Roberto Card
Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker, Peter Mittelstaedt (Germany), Bernard d’Espagnat, Jean-Marc
Le´vy-Leblond (France), Franco Selleri, Gino Tarozzi, Enrico Beltrametti, Marisa Dalla
Chiara, Gian-Carlo Ghirardi (Italy), Max Jammer (Israel), Jan Hilgevoord, Dennis Dieks
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(The Netherlands), Michael Redhead (UK), John Earman, Arthur Fine, John Norton,
Lawrence Sklar, David Malament, Jeffrey Bub, James Cushing, Bas van Fraassen, Paul
Teller, Gordon Fleming (USA), . . .
Most of them retired, some of them have passed away. The third generation (1980s onwards)
includes:
Michel Ghins (Belgium), Steve Savitt (Canada), Michel Bitbol (France), Brigitte Falken-
burg, Paul Busch (Germany), Miklo´s Redei, La´slo´ Szabo´ (Hungary), Jos Uffink (The Nether-
lands), Julian Barbour, Simon Saunders, Steven French Jeremy Butterfield, Harvey Brown
(UK), Jon Dorling (UK-The Netherlands) Richard Healey (UK-USA), Rob Clifton (Canada-
USA), David Albert, Don Howard, Tim Maudlin, Robert Rynasiewicz, Robert Weingard
(USA) . . .
Most of them have supervisors from the previous generation and have now retired or are
approaching retirement. Today philosophers of physics have populated the Earth (some
of them have left the branch, between fresh post-docs and approaching retirement, 1990s
onwards):
Pablo Acun˜a, Emily Adlam, Alexander Afriat, Valia Allori, Frank Arntzenius, Aristidis
Arageorgis, David Atkinson, Guido Bacciagaluppi, Jonathan Bain, Yuri Balashov, David
Baker, Jeffrey Barrett, Thomas Barrett, Robert Batterman, Gordon Belot, Jossi Berkovitz,
Thomas Bigaj, Soazig le Bihan, Robert Bishop, Alisa Bokulich, Katherine Brading, Tim
Budden, Craig Callender, Claudio Calosi, Elena Castellani, Adam Caulton, Karen Crowther,
Michael Cuffaro, Erik Curiel, Radin Dardashti, Richard Dawid, Talal Debs, Neil Dewar,
Michael Dickson, Julius Doboszewski, Mauro Dorato, Armond Duwell, Mathias Egg, Michael
Esfeld, Vincenzo Fano, Sam Fletcher, Doreen Fraser, Simon Friedrich, Roman Frigg, Matthias
Frisch, Chris Fuchs, Roberto Giuntini, Alexei Grinbaum, Alexandre Guay, Hans Halvorson,
Amit Hagar, Sebastian de Haro, Stefan Hartmann, Meir Hemmo, Leah Henderson, Ronnie
Hermens, Guy Hetzroni, Carl Hoefer, Mark Hogarth, Nick Huggett, Alexander Hu¨tteman,
Jenann Ismael, Vassilios Karakostas, Ruth Kastner, Eleanor Knox, Fred Kronz, James La-
dyman, Vincent Lam, Marc Lange, Federico Laudisa, Dennis Lehmkuhl, Matt Leifer, Peter
Lewis, Olimpia Lombardi, Janneke van Lith, Holger Lyre, John Manchak, Michela Massimi,
James Mattingly, Owen Maroney, Casey McCoy, Gordon McCabe, Kerry McKenzie, Mat-
teo Morganti, Margaret Morrison, Wayne Myrvold, Thomas Mu¨ller, Jill North, Antigone
Nounou, Thomas Pashby, Kent Peacock, Slobodan Perovic, Itamar Pitowsky, Brian Pitts,
Tomasz Placek, Oliver Pooley, Huw Price, James Read, Henk de Regt, Katinka Ridder-
bos, Dean Rickles, Bryan Roberts, Katie Robertson, Joshua Rosaler, Thomas Ryckman,
Laura Ruetsche, Juha Saatsi, Chris Smeenk, Michael Sto¨lzner, Ward Struyve, Mauricio
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Sua´rez, Michiel Seevinck, Orly Shenker, Sheldon Smith, Ada´n Sus, Nicolas Teh, Karim
The´bault, Chris Timpson, Giovanni Valente, Antony Valentini, Pieter Vermaas, Peter Vick-
ers, David Wallace, Jim Weatherall, Steven Weinstein, Charlotte Werndl, Chris Wu¨thrich,
Nino Zangh´ı, Henrik Zinkernagel, Lena Zuchowski, . . .
I have not strifed for completeness in listing these philosophers of physics: I am just bowing
my head sideways and all these names pour out, surprisingly in alphabetical order (I have
seen or talked to nearly every single one of them; I have not included PhDs; I should have
included myself but I didn’t; and embarrassing omisions will exist). The global community
of philosophers of physics I estimate between 100 and 250 people — this is in the order of
magnitude of one millionth % of the world’s population: how many philosophers of physics
does the world need?
Then there are physicists and mathematical physicists who publish, occasionally or fre-
quently, in the field of philosophy of physics, such as Sean Carroll, Lucien Hardy, Adrian
Kent, Klaas Landsman, Tony Leggett, Roger Penrose, Carlo Rovelli, Henry Stapp, Tony
Sudberry, Yogi Aharonov and Lev Vaidman.
The grandfathers published their papers mostly in philosophy of science journals, e.g.
Philosophy of Science and The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Studies in the
History and Philosophy of Science, in general philosophy journals, such as Synthese, Journal
of Philosophy, and Erkenntnis, and in conference volumes, e.g. the marvellous Minnesota
series in philosophy of science. Foundations of Physics and the short-lived Physics Essays
published philosophy of physics papers. In 1995, Studies in the History and Philosophy
of Modern Physics was born, as an off-spring of Studies in the History and Philosophy of
Science. Conferences, workshops and PhD theses devoted to philosophy of physics became
routine. During the past decades, summer schools devoted to philosophy of physics have
been organised. Philosophy of physics seems here to stay.
As happens with a burgeoning branch in academia, branching has set in. We can discern
roughly four sub-branches of philosophy of physics:
? Quantum Physics (quantum mechanics, quantum field theory).
? Spacetime and Cosmology (classical mechanics, the theories of relativity).
? Statistical Physics and Thermodynamics.
? Quantum Gravity and String Theory.
The grandfathers as well as the next generation were mainly interested in the first two
sub-branches. The last two arose later, in the order mentioned above. The attention to
speculative physics, e.g. quantum gravity and string theory, is the most recently grown sub-
branch. Yet still today, as a glance at the Pittsburgh Archive for the Philosophy of Science
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suggests, quantum physics attracts by far the most philosophical attention. On 18 July 2020,
the Pittsburgh Archive held 2882 philosophy of physics items, categorised as follows:
1. Quantum Theories: 1673 =
1301 (Quantum Mechanics) + 372 (Quantum Field Theory).
2. Relativity Theory: 756.
3. Statistical Mechanics and Thermodynamics: 303.
4. Fields and Particles: 289.
5. Classical Physics: 359.
6. Symmetry and Invariance: 358.
7. Cosmology: 257.
8. Quantum Gravity: 159.
9. Condensed Matter: 50.
10. Astrophysics: 11.
Admittedly, various papers are counted more than once: 4215 is the sum of the numbers
above, not 2882. But many if not most papers classified under ‘Particles and Fields’, ‘Sym-
metry and Invariance’ and ‘Condensed Matter Physics’ concern quantum theories. So when
correcting for these two considerations, we arguably shall still reach the conclusion that
quantum theories form the biggest sub-branch of philosophy of physics (at least 60%). To
assert that quantum physics has influenced philosophy of physics is a platitude, quantum
physics has been and still is constitutive of philosophy of physics.
To conclude: being constitutive of a growing and blossoming new branch at the tree of
philosophy, how much more influential on the tree of philosophy can you get?
3. Influence on Philosophy
The most obvious way to take the question whether quantum physics (quantum mechan-
ics, quantum field theory) has had any influence on philosophy generally is whether it has
had any influence on discussions about prominent questions addressed in philosophy of the
20th century. We can safely shove Continental Philosophy aside: the influence of quantum
physics on the writings of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Sartre, Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault,
Sloterdijk, Deleuze, Zizek, Badiou, Lacan, Lyotard, Laruelle, Kristeva, etc. is epsilonically
small if not zero — exceptions I am aware of is some of the work of M. Bitbol (2020), who
trades between Analytic and Continental Philosophy, and the same holds for Cassirer (1936).
Concerning Analytic Philosophy, we can take heed of the results of the Philosophical Papers
Survey, conducted by David Chalmers and David Bourget (2014; an update and extension is
in the making). They asked opinons about 30 controversial issues in philosophy and obtained
3226 responses:
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1. A priori knowledge: yes or no?
2. Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
3. Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?
4. Analytic–synthetic distinction: yes or no?
5. Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?
6. External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
7. Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
8. God: theism or atheism?
9. Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?
10. Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?
11. Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?
12. Logic: classical or non-classical?
13. Mental content: internalism or externalism?
14. Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
15. Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?
16. Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
17. Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
18. Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?
19. Newcomb’s problem: one box or two boxes?
20. Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?
21. Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum the-
ory?
22. Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?
23. Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?
24. Proper names: Fregean or Millian?
25. Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?
26. Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?
27. Time: A- or B-theory?
28. Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one
do?): switch or don’t switch?
29. Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?
30. Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possi-
ble?
Quantum physics had no discernible influence on any of these debates, full stop. Should
it have influenced these debates? For most issues, I don’t see what it could have contributed
or how it should contribute. There are possible exceptions. In the next Sections, we shall
next take a look at specific branches at the tree of philosophy, where some of the issues of
the Chalmers-Bourget list will return.
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4. Influence on Philosophy of Mind
The widely adumbrated and conceptually almost vacuous supervenience thesis (see below)
suggests that quantum physics should connect with philosophy of mind. After all, quan-
tum mechanics and quantum field theories are our best scientific theories of matter, and
the supervience thesis is about the relation between matter and mind: it claims that the
correlations between brain states and mental states imply that different mental states are
correlated to different brain states. None other than David Chalmers had a Chapter on the
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, in his landmark treatise The Conscious
Mind (1996). Yet a glance at any companion and anthology in the philosophy of mind
testifies to the absence of any influence of quantum physics.
Should it have any influence? The brain is a macroscopic physical system, according to
physics. The only part of quantum physics relevant for it might be condensed matter quan-
tum mechanics. But the brain is no neatly arrayed lattice of atoms of a single type (which is
the starting point in nearly every quantum-mechanical model of matter in the solid state),
but an extremely complicated and composite physical system with many types of atoms and
molecules, forming neurons having dendrites and axons, chemically and electrically interact-
ing all the time, overall in a solid state but having trillions of parts in a liquid state, which
makes the brain far too complex for any feasible quantum-mechanical model. Roger Penrose
(1989, p. 400) is one of the very few who has not closed down the road to quantum physics
when it comes to understanding of the brain: “One might speculate, however, that some-
where deep in the brain, cells are to be found of single quantum sensitivity. If this proves to
be the case, then quantum mechanics will be significantly involved in brain activity.” Might
speculate. Yet the idea has now been touched by the magic Nobel wand, and in Star Trek
Picard, I saw someone having a PhD in quantumconsciousness: who knows what the future
has in store for us?
So quantum mechanics has had nothing to say about the brain, despite first appearances
and some speculations otherwise notwithstanding. This is why quantum mechanics justifi-
ably is absent from philosophy of mind. Please don’t be alarmed that a Google-search the
www for ‘quantum consciousness’ yields almost 21 million hits — a search for ‘little green
men’ yields 300 million hits (on 23 October 2020).
The idea of Von Neumann and Wigner to invoke consciousness to solve the reality problem
of quantum mechanics, a.k.a. the measurement problem, which according to Wigner put an
end to ‘materialism’ (reduction of mind to matter, in a nutshell), has had no influence on
developments of, and debates in, the philosophy of mind. The Berkeley physicist Henry
Stapp (2009) belongs to the very few still pursuing this line. It shouldn’t have had either;
for sympathetic reviews of these issues, see Butterfield (1998) and the Lemma ‘Quantum
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Approaches Consciousness’ of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
5. Influence on Logic
Since 1936, when Birkhoff & Von Neumann published their seminal paper on quantum logic,
suggesting that quantum mechanics fitted a logic different from standard classical logic
better, quantum propositional logic has often been referred to as opening up the possibility
of the synthetic and a posteriori character of logic, rather than analytic and a priori. During
the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam used quantum propositional logic explicitly to defend the
empirical character of logic, i.e. as being synthetic and a posteriori; and Putnam intrepidly
trotted further by claiming that adopting quantum logic would dissolve various, if not all,
interpretation problems of quantum mechanics, in such a way that realism about quantum
mechanics could be upheld after all, contra Copenhagen. This has not ended well for Putnam,
who had to face a collection of stamping critics, among which McGrath (1971), Stairs (1983),
Bacciagaluppi (1993), Redhead (1994), and a caustic Maudlin (2005). Putnam (2005, p. 625)
has admitted this frankly. Charitably speaking, the best quantum logic can achieve is to
block the deductive road to some paradoxical answers to questions evoked by quantum
mechanics. The central problems of interpretation of quantum mechanics (reality problem,
locality problem, completeness problem) can however not be solved or dissolved by replacing
classical logic with quantum logic. Consequently, philosophers have lost interest in quantum
logic.
The interest of Birkhoff & Von Neumann resided in the structure of the lattice of pro-
jectors on Hilbert-space, which projectors were connected to so-called experimental proposi-
tions, used to report measurement-outcomes — as Von Neumann had already obeserved in
his Grundlagen (1932). The quantum propositional logic that seemed to emerge, however,
lacked both a conditional and a consequence relation; and a natural extension to predicate
logic was not in sight. These last-mentioned features were au fond the reason why quantum
logic has not been taken seriously by logicians (the central business of Logic being: what
follows from what, and how). Only algebraists interested in lattice theory payed attention
to it — small wonder that Birkhoff (1940) inaugurated lattice theory officially with the very
first monograph on the subject, with a title that leaves no room for misinterpretation what
the monograph is about: Lattice Theory. Thus via quantum logic, quantum mechanics has
had little if any influence on (the development of) logic in the 20th century.
Nonetheless serious attempts have been made to extend Birkhoff & Von Neumann’s work
to a full-blown deductive system, with a conditional and a consequence relation. The classic
two-volume anthology Hooker (1975) bears testimony to the interest in quantum logic. More
recent, Nishimura (1994) proposed proof theory for quantum logic, and Elgy and Tompits
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(1999) Gentzen-like methods (see further Giuntini et al., 2004, Engesser et al., 2009). We
also like to mention Baltag and Smets (2005) on ‘quantum actions’. Finally worth to mention
is Landsman’s employment of topos theory to provide a new mathematical characterisation
of quantum mechanics with Copenhagen overtones (‘Bohrification’), which mathematical
structure generates nothing less than an intuitionistic quantum logic (see Landsman’s (2017)
tome of nearly 900 pages, Chapter 12).
Quantum logic has never died, its philosophical interest has died, almost.
6. Influence on Metaphysics
The notorious interpretation problems of quantum mechanics are philosophical problems:
more specifically, metaphysical problems (see Muller, 2015). The reality problem of quantum
mechanics resides in metaphysical territory. The growing interest in Analytic Philosophy in
metaphysics since the 1960s , a.k.a. analytic metaphysics, had nothing to do with quantum
mechanics and its philosophical problems — but more with the decline of logical positivism
and the rise of realism in phlosophy of science. In Every Thing Must Go (2011), Ladyman
and Ross ferociously criticised the lack of influence of scientific achievements generally on
analytic metaphysics:
The result has been the rise to dominance of projects in analytic metaphysics that have
almost nothing to do with (actual) science. Hence there are now, once again, esoteric
debates about substance, universals, identity, time, properties, and so on, which make little
or no reference to science, and worse, which seem to presuppose that science must be
irrelevant to their resolution. They are based on prioritizing armchair intuitions about the
nature of the universe over scientific discoveries.
Ladyman and Ross proclaim naturalising metaphysics, just as Quine had proclaimed nat-
uralising epistemology, which boiled down to replacing it with cognitive psychology, clouded
in vapor mumbling that philosophy ‘is continuous’ with science. Resounding echoes of logical
positivism to be sure. “Philosophy of science is philosophy enough”, Quine quipped. On
behalf of Ladyman and Ross, one could say: philosophy of physics is metaphysics enough.
In recent decades, various philosophers, analytic metaphysicists and philosophers of science,
have engaged in naturalised metaphysics. The annual conferences of the Society for the
Metaphysics of Science in the USA (since 2016) are tokens of it; for literature, see for ex-
ample Schrenk (2017). Ironically, because the endeavour to interpret quantum mechanics
has lived in metaphysical territory since its inception, it has been a piece of very natu-
ralised metaphysics, and therefore the call to naturalise metaphysics is partly an invitation
to analytic metaphysicists to acknowledge this very fact.
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Some exceptions include Wilson (2020), who relates the nature of contingency to Everett’s
interpretation of quantum mechanics, Pashby (2013, 2016) on persistence and temporal
parts, Maudlin (1998) on mereology and quantum mechanics; see also Maudling (2010) and
Morganti (2020) for serious interaction between metaphysics and philosophy of physics.
There remain issues in analytic metaphysics that seem beyond naturalising, such as
whether abstract objects exist, ‘absolute generality’ is a coherent concept, and all logically
possible worlds exist (pace DeWittified Everett). Ladyman and Ross proposed that we
should stop thinking about these issues, where no progress has been made and can be made:
a hopeless waste of brain power, which could be employed for so many better things in life.
All in all, on the one hand, the endeavour to interpret quantum mechanics has been
metaphysical in nature from its inception, and therefore quantum mechanics did have an
influence on metaphysics, but its influence was restricted to feeding philosophy of physics.
On the other hand, analytic metaphysics has proceeded without any influence by quantum
mechanics until recently, with the advent of naturalised metaphysics and ‘the metaphysics of
science’ movement. Whether quantum mechanics ought to have more influence in metaphy-
sics: that depends on the metaphysical issue at hand. Even if you cherish a modest ambition
for metaphysics, such as E.J. Lowe’s (1998) ambition of erecting and analysing a framework
of general concepts that are used and presupposed by all scientific disciplines, from physics
to history and from biology to sociology, and therefore needs to be independent of the spe-
cific contents of the achievements in all those disciplines, then an occasional serious look at
science, in particular at quantum physics, is needed to ensure that the erected and analysed
framework of general concepts will cover the achievements of quantum physics too.
7. Influence on Ethics
When we subsume the issue of free will in Ethics, then some might think that quantum
mechanics bears on this very issue in the light of ‘The Free Will Theorem’, by J.H. Conway
and S. Kochen (2006), which claims that quantum mechanics ensures that we have free
will. An enduring debate since Augustine of Hippo (5th Century) scratched his head about
Predestination and the Lord’s imperative to lead a moral life in order to go to Heaven, has
been finally decided, after 15 centuries, by quantum mechanics?
The theorem of Conway and Kochen, which is just another version of Bell’s celebrated
theorem, essentially proves that, for the entangled two-particle system in the usual Bell set-
up, a local deterministic model plus the assumption that Alice an Bob are free to set their
spin-measurement apparatus in any direction they want to is incompatible with quantum
mechanics. Landsman (2017) has argued that the notion of free will surreptitiously employed
by Conway and Kochen is D.K. Lewis’ ‘local miracle compatibilism’, so that in Landsman’s
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view, the ‘Free Will Theorem’ “challenges compatibilist free will a` la Lewis (albeit in a
contrived way via bipartite EPR-type experiments), falling short of supporting libertarian
free will.” If and when this claim remains standing, we can expect some influence of quantum
mechanics on the free will issue in Ethics. But for now, we must conclude that quantum
physics has had no influence on the free will debate. Again, consult any recent companion
or anthology on free will: quantum mechanics is absent.
Another intrusion of Ethics in the philosophical discourse about quantum mechanics
worth mentioning is Lewis’ (2004) rejection of the many-world interpretation of quantum
mechanics on ethical grounds. For this interpretation makes one accept the existence of an
infinity of worlds with each world having numerous counterparts of some or several human
beings on counterpart Earth suffering intensely (due to low but non-zero probabilities of
terrible events happening). Such an infinite increase in suffering no one ought to accept.
So Ethics has had some influence on the philosophical discourse on quantum physics. In
recent years, ethical considerations have become more vocal in discussions about the Everett
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Finally, worthy of mention is Ismael’s book How physics makes us free (2016), a panegyric
on compatibilism which mostly concerns classical physics.
8. Influence on Philosophy of Science
After the great debates in general philosophy of science about the scientific method and
the rationality of science in mid-twentieth century (Kuhn, Popper, Feyerabend, Lakatos,
Laudan), philosophy of science grew new sub-branches, notably philosophy of physics, of
biology, and of economics. Quantum mechanics did have some influence on the realism
debate. As an illustration of the under-determination thesis, quantum mechanics is second
to none: it has empiricially equivalent rivals in the De Broglie-Bohm theory and the theory of
Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber. On top of this, the many interpretations of quantum mechanics
are a thorn in the realist’s flesh: if the aim of science is to provide, by means of its theories
and models, a literally true description of reality, then the part of reality that quantum
mechanics is about seems out of the reach of science. Rather than conclude that quantum
mechanics makes science fail, perhaps it would be better to have a view of science that sets
aims for science that can be reached and have been reached, also by quantum mechanics.
So quantum mechanics has been invoked in the realism debate in philosophy of science,
and rarely has it been to strenghten the realist’s case, as Van Fraassen’s book on quantum
mechanics bears witness (1991).
Van Fraassen’s (1970, 1972) state-space version of the semantic view on scientific the-
ories was inspired by E.W. Beth’s application of logical semantics to quantum theory and
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by quantum logic, which shows an indirect influence of quantum physics on philosophy of
science.
Last but not least, I want write down some snarky sentences about Healey’s recent book
The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy (2017). The title suggests that nothing less than a
revolution has taken place in philosophy, due to quantum mechanics. Say what?! Most of
the topics Healey treats belong to philosophy of science (theories, models, representation,
probability, explanation, objectivity), and some of them belong to metaphysics (causation,
fundamentality). Healey claims that quantum mechanics has changed ‘our’ view of the topics
mentioned above between brackets. On closer inspection, and careful reading, what the claim
boils down to is that not quantum mechanics, but that quantum mechanics plus Healey’s
pragmatist interpretation has motivated Healey to adopt new views on the mentioned philo-
sophical issues. Well, as soon as a substantial majority of philosophers subscribes to Healey’s
pragmatist views, we can welcome Healey as the prophet of a revolution in philosophy. Hail
Healey! Which presumably will not happen. That quantum mechanics has influenced the
philosophical views of Healey shows that quantum physics stricto sensu has influenced phi-
losophy, because Healey is a philosopher. Presumably there will be others like him, in this
regard, in particular philosophers of physics when they engage with general philosophy of
science. But that’s about it.
9. Recapitulation
Although quantum physics has influenced philosophy in the sense that it has grown a new
flourishing and blossoming branch of the tree of philosophy, apart from some recent con-
tact between philosophy of physics and metaphysics, quantum physics has had hardly any
influence on philosophy at all, and at best some influence on metaphysics, mostly in recent
times. With regard to prominent issues intensely thought about by philosophers, such as
those on the Chalmers-Bouget list, we dare conclude that it is difficult to see how quantum
physics could bear on those issues. If it cannot, it ought not, for ought implies can.
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